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Abstract 
Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, 
reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the 
neocortex?  The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate 
the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from 
the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic 
because, even in the absence of report, subjects might engage in post-perceptual cognitive 
processing. Therefore, to isolate the neural basis of consciousness, a no-cognition paradigm is 
needed. Here, I describe a no-cognition approach to binocular rivalry and outline how this 
approach can help resolve debates about the neural basis of consciousness. 
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What is the Neural Basis of Consciousness? 
In recent years the scientific study of consciousness (see Glossary) has focused on finding the 
neural basis of consciousness in the brain. There are many theories of the neural basis of 
consciousness, but in broad strokes theories tend to divide on whether consciousness is rooted 
in the ‘front’ or the ‘back’ of the brain. More specifically, they divide on whether perceptual 
consciousness is based in the neural circuits in prefrontal and parietal cortex that are devoted to 
cognitive processes like thinking, reasoning, evaluating, reporting, deciding, memory or, 
alternatively, whether perceptual consciousness is based in areas in occipital and temporal cortex 
that are devoted to sensory processing. 
Garnering firm support for cognitive theories versus sensory (or non-cognitivist) theories has 
proven methodologically challenging. However, it is widely held that the no-report paradigm [1] 
can help adjudicate between these two perspectives. The logic of the no-report paradigm is as 
follows: suppose we seek to isolate the neural basis of consciously seeing, say, a face. Clearly, we 
would want to contrast brain activations in which a subject is consciously seeing a face with brain 
activations in which the subject is not consciously seeing a face.  However, we typically only know 
whether subjects are consciously seeing a face via their own self-reports. So it may seem that the 
neural basis of consciousness of a face will inevitably be entangled with the neural basis of the 
post-perceptual cognitive processes underlying judging what the stimulus is, maintaining that 
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answer in working memory and deciding what response to make [1, 2]. The no-report paradigm 
is supposed to be a way of finessing this problem by using reports to find and validate indicators 
of conscious perception that work in the absence of reports.   
Although the no-report paradigm has been influential in recent years, it has a fatal flaw: 
eliminating reports does not eliminate post-perceptual cognitive processes if the subjects are 
thinking and reasoning about the stimulus. We must find a way to replace the "no-report" 
paradigm with a "no-post-perceptual-cognition" paradigm. In this article, I suggest a path 
forward. 
 
The Opposing Sides 
As indicated above, theories tend to divide on whether consciousness is rooted in the ‘front’ or 
the ‘back’ of the brain. However, ‘front' and 'back' are vague terms, and both sides regard parts 
of the parietal cortex as part of the neural basis of consciousness.  The real neocortex-location 
issue is whether certain regions (not all) in front of the central sulcus are necessary for perceptual 
consciousness. Prefrontalists say yes, advocates of the "back" say no. Prefrontalists emphasize 
dorsolateral, medial prefrontal, anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal regions of prefrontal cortex. 
But front/back is really a surrogate for the more fundamental issue of whether consciousness is 
cognitive or whether it is perceptual (in a wide sense that includes imagery, dreaming and 
hallucination).  It is because activations in some areas of prefrontal cortex appear to be necessary 
for cognitive function that it looms so large in these debates. (What is meant by cognition here 
is thought-based mentality, notably reasoning, deciding, evaluating, reporting and working 
memory.)  Advocates of the "back of the head" view of consciousness can allow that if thought 
has its own kind of phenomenal consciousness, it might be based in cognitive regions of 
prefrontal cortex. The important difference between cognitivist and non-cognitivist views is that 
the non-cognitivist says perceptual consciousness does not require cognitive processing. 
This ‘front of the head’ versus ‘back of the head’ debate maps onto popular theories of 
consciousness.  Prefrontalists are represented by the global workspace theory [3]) and the 
higher order theory [4, 5] of consciousness. According to the global workspace theory, sensory 
activations compete among themselves, with dominant neural coalitions in sensory areas 
triggering workspace neurons in frontal and parietal cortex, forming an active reverberating 
network that makes sensory information available to reasoning, reporting, decision-making and 
other cognitive processes.  According to higher order theories of consciousness, what makes a 
perception conscious is that there is an accompanying cognitive state about the perception. 
Meanwhile, the back of the head accounts, are represented by the integrated information 
theory [6] and the recurrent processing theory [7] of consciousness. According to the Integrated 
Information Theory, a system is conscious to the extent that it is both differentiated and 
integrated.  According to the recurrent processing account, consciousness is a matter of the 
formation of feedback loops with certain neural properties.   
This debate between advocates of the front and the back is widely recognized to be the focus of 
current thinking about consciousness.  Indeeed, the Templeton World Charity Foundation is 
funding an "adversarial collaboration" to—among other things-- resolve the issue between 
 3 
advocates of the front and back of the neocortex [8].  The frontalists recently published a 
manifesto [9] in Science, arguing that if we are to make conscious machines, we should base them 
on the computations that underlie human consciousness.  The computations they describe are 
those advocated by global workspace and higher order theorists.   
One caution about the neuroscientific work to be presented: it is all correlational and of course 
one must be careful in inferring anything about the neural basis of mentality from correlational 
studies. Causal studies in which the effects of brain interventions (e.g. lesions, electrical 
stimulation, optogenetics) are assessed are better to the extent that they are available. 
 
Using Binocular Rivalry to Study Consciousness 
Unusual phenomena often provide the test cases for theories.  One such phenomenon is 
binocular rivalry, in which different stimuli presented to the two eyes results in oscillating 
perceptions.  Binocular rivalry has played a central role in consciousness research because it 
allows researchers to hold a stimulus constant while the contents of consciousness shift.  Error! 
Reference source not found. (panel A) depicts the brain of a subject who is wearing red/green 
glasses and is viewing a red house superimposed on a green face.  One eye receives a face 
stimulus and the other a house stimulus.  The conscious perception—diagrammed in panel B—is 
not a combined image but rather conscious alternation, with all or most of the visual field filled 
by the conscious perception of either a face or a house, alternating every few seconds.  Subjects 
are aware of intermediate mixtures between a face and house, but the experience consists 
mainly of one percept or the other, with more complete dominance if the stimuli are small.  
Subjects can influence which of the percepts dominates, but inevitably the non-dominant 
percept takes over.  
Why does this alternation occur? According to the prevailing account of rivalry, pools of neurons 
representing each of the incompatible stimuli inhibit one another [10].  In the presence of neural 
noise, one pool wins temporarily. Then that pool is weakened by adaptation and the other pool 
representing the other alternative takes over.  Because of the impact of neural noise, the time of 
the transitions cannot be predicted on the basis of past transitions.  Binocular rivalry occurs in 
many animals, including fruit flies, and can occur in humans with invisible stimuli, showing that 
binocular rivalry is not intrinsically a conscious process [11]. 
 
Decoding Transitions vs Decoding Contents 
When subjects in a binocular rivalry experiment are scanned during the rivalrous perceptions, 
what is found is neural correlates of the transitions between one percept and the other in visual 
areas in the back of the head and stronger differential activations in cognitive areas in the 
prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex.    These experiments also isolated the neural basis of the 
perceptual contents themselves, activations in the fusiform face area in the case of face 
perceptions and activations in the parahippocampal place area in the case of house perceptions.  
Both areas are in the back of the head.  A conclusion often drawn from these early rivalry 
experiments, especially on the basis of the stronger frontal correlations with transitions, was that 
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although the neural basis of the contents of perception such as face content or house content 
was in the back of the head, what makes those contents conscious was based in the front of the 
head [12]. 
It is important to distinguish the neural basis of transitions in rivalry from the neural basis of the 
contents of the rivalrous states themselves [13].  Of course what we are interested in is mainly 
the neural basis of the contents, but the neural basis of the transitions can be important in finding 
the neural basis of the contents.  If there is no prefrontal difference linked to perceptual 
transitions, then we can conclude that the perceptual contents cannot be prefrontal.  However, 
if there is a prefrontal difference linked to perceptual transitions, it is much less clear what to 
conclude.  The prefrontal difference might be due to differences in preconscious stages of 
processing [14] or to differential attention to the changing stimulus, to elevation of arousal due 
to a transition, or to motor control of response keys rather than changes in the content of 
conscious perception.  What is crucial in deciding between theories of consciousness is a method 
of separating out those transition-related changes that are systematically related to perceptual 
contents. 
The methodology of many binocular rivalry experiments is designed only to detect transitions, 
not the contents themselves.  Often studies of binocular rivalry involve comparisons between 
binocular shifts and what is called "replay"-- real changes between say a face stimulus and a 
house stimulus with the same contents. fMRI always involves subtraction of one condition from 
another.  (See part C of Figure 1.) In this paradigm, transition-related activations during replay 
are subtracted from transition-related activations during rivalry.  Since both cases are supposed 
to involve the same conscious perceptual contents, in principle what is left after the subtraction 
is correlates of the transitions without any information about the perceptual contents 
themselves 
No-Report Paradigm in Binocular Rivalry 
The stronger frontal correlations with transitions in binocular rivalry may have been due to the 
fact that the cognitive processes involved in deciding what to report involve frontal activations.  
That idea motivated the "no report" paradigm.  If one eye is shown a grating moving to the left 
and the other eye is shown a grating moving to the right, the subject is aware of leftward motion 
(usually in the whole visual field), then rightward motion, then leftward motion, etc.  Using a 
method first discovered in [15], a recent study used a characteristic eye movement called 
optokinetic nystagmus that correlates with the perceived direction of motion as indexed by the 
subjects' reports [16]. Smooth pursuit to the left plus sharp jerky motions to the right correlate 
with reports of conscious perception of the grating as moving leftward and there is a 
corresponding association for rightward motion. In binocular rivalry, there are always brief 
intermediate states that involve patches of percepts of the two stimuli and aspects of the 
nystagmus correlated with that too.   
Once the researchers had verified the accuracy of nystagmus using self-reports, they put subjects 
in the scanner. However, once in the scanner, subjects were not given any task and they were 
 5 
not asked for any reports. The researchers then looked at differences in brain activations when 
nystagmus indicated a perceptual transition. Of course, subjects could testify after the 
experiment was over that their percepts were alternating as usual.  The transitions mainly 
reflected differences in perceptual areas in the back and middle of the head. The article 
summarizes: “Importantly, when observers passively experienced rivalry without reporting 
perceptual alternations, a different picture [that is, different from what happens with report] 
emerged." That different picture is that differential neural activity in prefrontal areas was minor 
compared to activity in temporal and parietal regions.  They "conclude that prefrontal areas are 
associated with active report and introspection …” [16, p. 1738].  And the article’s title reflects 
this emphasis: “Binocular Rivalry: Frontal Activity Relates to Introspection and Action But Not to 
Perception”. 
This result led to a flurry of controversy [17, 18] in which different types of experiments seemed 
to differ in whether they showed prefrontal differences in perceptual transitions in a paradigm 
closely related to binocular rivalry. These results presented serious challenges to the conclusion 
just described.  In particular,  prefrontal reflections of perceptual contents were decoded in a no-
report experiment with monkeys using electrophysiological methods (electrodes inserted in 
cortical regions) that are known to be more sensitive to neural activations than the fMRI used in 
the result mentioned in the last paragraph [17].  Impressively, these results used monkeys that 
had not been trained on a discrimination task, ruling out covert decision-making that would have 
been expected to make a prefrontal difference (personal communication from Theofanis 
Panagiotaropoulos, the corresponding author of [17].). Later work in the same lab has been 
devoted to recording from grids of micro-electrodes ("Utah" arrays) placed in the prefrontal 
cortex of monkeys in a binocular rivalry setup with gratings in different directions, suggesting 
decoding of direction from prefrontal cortex [19, 20].  In addition, another group was able to 
decode perceptual contents from prefrontal areas in binocular rivalry [18].  However, this result 
did not use a no-report paradigm so the prefrontal representation could have been linked to the 
cognitive processes underlying reporting.   
A caution about decoding from prefrontal cortex: because of linkages across the whole brain, it 
may be possible to "decode" anything from anywhere in the brain if one has sufficiently sensitive 
detection. The real issue is which regions involve optimal decoding over a wide range of 
circumstances.  
In sum, work using the no-report paradigm has shown that even without reports, both contents 
and transitions can be decoded from frontal cortex during binocular rivalry.  However the no-
report paradigm is not dead.  It can be modified to avoid the problems just described, as I will 
argue in the next section. 
 
The Need for a No-Post-Perceptual Cognition Paradigm 
Suppose it is confirmed using microelectrode arrays that conscious perceptions (not just 
transitions) can be decoded from prefrontal cortex in binocular rivalry in a no-report paradigm.  
Would that result show that prefrontal cortex is part of the neural basis of conscious perception?  
No, because of the "bored monkey" problem.  The monkeys in these experiments spend hours 
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looking at gratings going up and down without any task other than fixating.  If you were in this 
perceptual situation, you might have some cognitive states—thinking, wondering, questioning, 
musing, and the like-- concerning the grating moving up when it is moving up and the grating 
moving down when it is moving down.   As a consequence, the micro-electrode arrays could be 
tapping post-perceptual cognitive processing concerning which way the gratings are moving 
rather than the perceptions of the gratings themselves.  Note that I am not talking about 
daydreaming or mind-wandering.  Those states cannot be controlled and, in any case, would not 
engender systematic error.  The problem is that the monkeys may be undergoing cognitive 
processes that are systematically aligned with one or another of the rivalrous percepts. 
This problem reveals a flaw in the reasoning behind the "no report" paradigm.  Eliminating report 
is only successful in isolating the neural basis of conscious perception if it eliminates post-
perceptual cognitive processing such as thought and judgment about the reportable properties 
that is systematically correlated with one of the perceptual representations.  The same problem 
infects recently rediscovered [21] older versions  of the "no-report" paradigm involving humans 
[22] since nothing was done to prevent subjects from thinking about their alternating percepts. 
So, what we really need to do is to replace the "no-report" paradigm with a "no-cognition" 
paradigm—or better, a "no post-perceptual cognition" paradigm (to avoid begging the question 
against views that take conscious perception to be cognitive).  But this may seem manifestly 
impossible.  When subjects see things, they are free to make perceptual judgments and think 
about what they see. You can't stop subjects—including monkeys-- from thinking. We seem to 
be at an impasse. 
 
The No-Post-Perceptual Cognition Paradigm in Action 
There is, however, a solution to be found in a recent experiment by Brascamp and colleagues 
[23].  (To avoid misunderstanding, note that this experiment did not involve nystagmus.)  In this 
study, the authors reasoned that detection of prefrontal transitions in binocular rivalry might 
have to do with the attraction of attention to perceptual transitions rather than [perceptual 
transitions per se]. To circumvent this, they designed stimuli for which the transitions would be 
"inconspicuous", and thus would not draw the subject’s attention. The stimuli were randomly 
moving dots (see Figure 2).  Frequently (every 300 ms) there were transitions in which each dot 
moved in a random direction and the coherence of the dots' motion (the extent to which dots 
moved together) shifted.  In one condition, the dots in the two eyes were of different colors, 
whereas in the other condition, the dots were of the same color.  
The key idea is this: for the condition in which the eyes are shown different color dots, subjects 
noticed the rivalrous change of dominant eye because the color changed.  However, for the 
condition in which the dots were of the same color, the subjects were much less likely to notice 
the change of dominant eye.  The explanation is that they had a hard time detecting whether a 
change was due to a change of dominant eye or to one of the frequent changes in which each 
dot moves in a different direction. Thus, the conscious changes due to a change in dominant eye 
were "inconspicuous" and could be expected not to draw attention and not be noticed. (Subjects 
are generally not aware of which of their eyes is dominating the perception in binocular rivalry.). 
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Thus, Brascamp, et al. had created a case of binocular rivalry in which the rivalry did not draw 
attention. 
How do we know that the subjects were actually consciously experiencing two different 
perceptual contents when the different stimuli dominate?  It might be said that both stimuli were 
experienced simply as randomly moving dots with constantly changing motion and coherence 
patterns.  In that case, there would be no conscious difference between one eye dominating and 
the other eye dominating.   
Brascamp, et al.addressed this issue.  They were able to confirm, using a number of different 
methods, that perceptual binocular rivalry was occurring for the same-color patterns in Figure 2-
-that is, that the two displays triggered different perceptions.  One such method involved a 
separate experiment varying the dot density in the two eyes. Note that at any given moment, the 
arrays shown to the two eyes differed in the direction of motion of every dot and the extent to 
which its motion cohered with the motion of other dots. When the two eyes receive different 
inputs, there are only two alternative perceptual situations: (1) the percept can reflect some kind 
of combination or merger of the two inputs or (2) the percept can reflect rivalrous alternation of 
the sort described earlier.  See Box 1 for an explanation of the factors that determine merger as 
opposed to rivalrous alternation. When Brascamp, et al.asked for reports of density, they tended 
to get responses indicating that the perceived density  reflected the number of dots shown to 
one eye rather than any sort of combination or merger of the two eyes.   
This result confirmed that there was little merging in their procedure, thus showing that often 
subjects must be experiencing real conscious rivalry.  They further confirmed conscious rivalry by 
exploiting known temporal regularities of rivalry. Subjects were consciously experiencing 
repeated shifting of the patterns, but as noted earlier, they had no way of distinguishing between 
the transitions that reflected rivalry and those that reflected the regular change of patterns.   
Were the rivalrous switches inaccessible or unreportable?  No!  They were accessible but mostly 
not accessed.  The rivalrous switches were (mostly) indistinguishable from the switches that were 
happening every 300 ms, so the rivalrous switches did not stand out and were not noticed and 
so did not produce differential cognitive states.  Brascamp, et al.say (p. 1674): "Based on the 
sensitivity index, dʹ, detection of switches in the same color condition could not be distinguished 
from chance, demonstrating just how inconspicuous these switches are.”  That is, the subjects 
were (approximately) at chance on distinguishing the rivalrous switches from the run-of-the-mill 
switches that were happening all the time.  All switches—rivalrous and non-rivalrous-- were 
noticeable, accessible and reportable, but the subjects mostly could not pick out the rivalrous 
switches from the ones that were happening all the time. 
So, what did Brascamp, et al.find? Using fMRI, they could detect prefrontal differences in the 
case of different color dots but not in the case when the dots were of the same color.  As they 
say, prefrontal differences in activation for the inconspicuously different stimuli were "altogether 
undetectable in our procedure".  They conclude that “when viewing a conflicting or ambiguous 
stimulus, a switch in perception may arise in the visual system, but noticing the change may rely 
on brain regions dedicated to behavioral responses" [23, p. 1677].   The upshot is that it may be 
noticing that brings in prefrontally represented cognitive concepts—the perceptions in cases that 
do not draw attention are based in perceptual areas in the back and middle of the head. 
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Note that although Brascamp, et al.justified the method of inconspicuous switches by appealing 
to the need to avoid attracting attention to the switches, there is another benefit of the 
procedure, and one that is the focus here: this method avoids the systematic change of cognitive 
states like thought and judgment that can accompany rivalrous changes.  If one first thinks that 
one is seeing a grating moving upward and then thinks that one is seeing a grating moving 
downward, then that change of thought, based in prefrontal cortex, can, if correlated with the 
percept, seem to indicate a prefrontal change even if prefrontal cortex plays no role in 
consciousness at all.  In precluding such a sequence of events, their methodology is not just a no-
report methodology, it is a no-post-perceptual-cognition methodology.  The upshot is that in at 
least one instance of a no-post-perceptual-cognition paradigm, there may be no prefrontal 
component to conscious change. 
 
Anticipating an Objection 
I can imagine an objection being raised that the univariate fMRI used in the study by Brascamp, 
et al. is not sensitive enough to capture the differences between the two percepts.  Case in point, 
Odegaard, et al.  [24] argued that failure to find prefrontal differences with fMRI may miss real 
effects that would be detected by other means. They mention that ECog recordings in which 
there is direct intracranial electrophysiological recording in human surgical epileptics (in which 
the skull is opened and electrode grids are placed on the cortex) showed differential prefrontal 
activity even when subjects were not required to report the stimulus. Odegaard, et al. are right 
that ECog may pick up changes missed by fMRI but using patients to test rivalry without doing 
anything to keep them from thinking about what they are experiencing does not satisfy the point 
made here that the subjects may be thinking about the perceptual contents even when not 
required to report on them.  Still, the basic point that Odegaard et al. were making does apply to 
the Brascamp, et al. experiment since the rivalry changes in that experiment, involving only 
direction and coherence of motion of dots, might require temporal and spatial resolution too fine 
grained for fMRI.  Thus, although the Brascamp, et al. experiment is evidence against 
prefrontalism, further experiments with ECog could support prefrontalism. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In sum, the "no-report" methodology was an overly simple approach to the methodological 
problem of isolating the neural basis of consciousness.  The real methodological problem is how 
to distinguish the neural basis of conscious perception from the neural basis of thought, 
judgment and reasoning.  There may be no general solution to this problem, but at least in the 
case of binocular rivalry a solution may be at hand.  I believe that the experiment reported in 
Brascamp et al. does provide some support for non-cognitive theorists, but the main point of this 
article is to home in on the methodological issue rather than supporting one side.   
 
BOX 1. Rivalry vs Merger 
When different stimuli are presented to the two eyes, in some cases the perceptions merge and 
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in other cases they alternate in dominating the perception.  What determines the difference?  
Figure I shows a masculine and feminine face presented, each to a different eye.  If the subject 
attends to local features or to parts of the faces, such as the eyes, the subject experiences 
standard binocular rivalry, as indicated in the diagram by "Alternating percepts".  Standard 
binocular rivalry also occurs if the faces are presented upside down. However, if the subjects 
attend to holistic features such as gender, there is fusion instead of rivalry: the subject sees an 
androgynous face that blends masculine and feminine features [25].   
What determines whether there is rivalry or merger?  We can call rivalrous stimuli "incompatible" 
and merging stimuli "compatible".  Mere luminance differences don't contribute to 
incompatibility so long as the items of different luminance are of the same shape and contrast 
polarity.  (Contrast polarity is a matter of being lighter or darker than the background. Both the 
'X' and the 'O' of Figure II are composed of elements that are lighter than the background, so they 
are the same in contrast polarity.)  The items of Figure II are compatible locally because the 
squares are of the same shape and contrast polarity but differ globally ('X' vs 'O').   All the subjects 
in [26] experienced fusion of these items rather than rivalry.  And other experiments using more 
complex setups have also reported that holistic differences don't matter if there are no relevant 
local differences [27].   
The explanation of the primacy of the local is that local properties tend to be represented in 
monocular parts of visual cortex. There is more binocular processing in higher vision where 
receptive field sizes are much larger than in monocular areas. Binocular rivalry usually depends 
on monocularly represented features, features that differ in the two eyes, whereas what we 
naively think of as the contents of perception, e.g. seeing an ‘X’ vs seeing an ‘O’, are represented 
binocularly, mainly in higher areas. 
 
BOX 2. Rivalry and Predictive Coding 
The local nature of binocular rivalry creates difficulties for many theories of perception.  For 
example, the "predictive processing" approach [28] regards perception as a matter of "controlled 
hallucination" in which hypotheses involving general knowledge of what might be seen confront 
the data.  As mentioned earlier, a commonly used binocular rivalry stimulus is one in which a face 
is shown to one eye and a house to the other.  What the subject experiences is an alternation 
between a face and house perception, in which each fills the whole visual field for a brief period.  
Advocates of the predictive processing approach see the issue in terms of conflict between a face 
hypothesis and a house hypothesis, fed by the general knowledge that nothing is both a face and 
a house.  Andy Clark [29] explains the reasoning, following [30]: 
But why, under such circumstances, do we not simply experience a combined or 
interwoven image: a kind of house/face mash-up for example? … Such mash-ups do not 
constitute a viable hypothesis given our more general knowledge about the visual world. 
For it is part of that general knowledge that, for example, houses and faces do not occupy 
the same place, at the same scale, at the same time. … This, indeed, may be the deep 
explanation of the existence of competition between the higher-level hypotheses in the 
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first place — these hypotheses must compete because the system has learned that ‘only 
one object can exist in the same place at the same time’ ....  
But as we have seen, apart from high level attention of the sort mentioned in connection with 
Figure I, general knowledge hypotheses about faces being different from houses and one thing 
in one place at one time play little role in determining the difference between compatible and 
incompatible stimuli.  The most important determinants are low level local features.   
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Binocular rivalry.  In binocular rivalry, "incompatible" stimuli presented to each eye results in 
dominance of first one stimulus, then the other, ad infinitum.  (What makes stimuli incompatible 
is described in Box 1.)   
 
Cognition: thought-based mental states and processes, for example, reasoning, deciding, 
evaluating, reporting and memory.  What is especially important to cognition is transitions among 
propositional states that are based on the contents of those states. 
 
Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness is what it is like to have an experience.  Phenomenal 
consciousness can be distinguished at least at the conceptual level from access-consciousness: 
global availability of information. In this article, the term 'consciousness' is restricted to 
phenomenal consciousness. 
 
Fixation: To fixate a thing or area of space is to point your eyes at it. 
Global Workspace theory of Consciousness: According to the global workspace theory, sensory 
activations compete with one another for dominance.  Dominant sensory neural coalitions trigger 
workspace neurons in frontal and parietal cortex, forming an active reverberating network that 
makes sensory information available to reasoning, reporting, decision-making and other 
cognitive processes. 
Higher Order Theories of Consciousness: According to higher order theories of consciousness, 
what makes a perception conscious is that it is accompanied by a cognitive state about the 
perception.  Higher order theories of consciousness differ in whether the higher order state itself 
has a sensory content that could compete with the first order content or whether the higher 
order content is more of a pointer with an index of reliability of the first order state. 
Information Integration Theory of Consciousness: According to IIT, a system is conscious to the 
extent that it is differentiated and that its different possible states are integrated with one 
another.   A highly conscious and therefore highly integrated system cannot be decomposed into 
separate subsystems that are themselves as highly integrated and differentiated.  IIT is a theory 
of what makes a system a conscious subject, whereas the other theories of consciousness are 
primarily concerned with conscious states of a subject. 
Neural basis of consciousness: the minimal neural activity that is sufficient for consciousness.  It 
is possible that there are different neural bases of consciousness in different conscious beings. 
Perceptual consciousness: conscious phenomenology involved in perception.  What cognitivists 
and non-cognitivists disagree about is whether perceptual consciousness requires prefrontal 
cortex activations. Non-cognitivists allow that the non-perceptual phenomenology of thought 
might be rooted in prefrontal cortex.  
 
No-report paradigm.  In a no-report paradigm, subjects are assigned no task of discriminating 
one stimulus from another.  In no-report paradigms, reports can be used to calibrate other 
methods of indexing consciousness, such as the OKN reported in the text. 
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Optokinetic nystagmus (OKN).  During a conscious percept of a moving grating, a subject's eyes 
move slowly in the direction of motion and then sharply back in the opposite direction 
Perception: sensory objective representation of the environment 
 
Prefrontalists: Those who hold that activation of certain circuits in front of the central sulcus are 
necessary for perceptual consciousness, notably dorsolateral, medial prefrontal, anterior 
cingulate and orbitofrontal regions. Prefrontalists subscribe to either the global workspace 
theory or to the higher order theory of consciousness. 
Recurrent Activation Theory of Consciousness: The content of consciousness depends on which 
circuits are activated but what makes those contents conscious is reverberating feedback to early 
sensory areas that satisfies certain spatial and temporal constraints, especially if it involves burst 
firing of neurons.   
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Figure 1 
Figure 1. Binocular Rivalry. (A) shows the brain of a person looking through red and green glasses 
at a superimposed picture of a face and a house.  (B) shows the percept, first of a face, then a 
house, then a face.  (C) shows the replay that in many experiments is compared with rivalry I am 
grateful to Frank Tong for this diagram.  See also [31]. 
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A
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Figure 2 
Figure 2. Inconspicuous Binocular Rivalry. Quasi-random motion stimuli used in binocular rivalry 
experiments by [23].  The alternation between the blue and red dots at the top is very noticeable 
but the alternation of the same-color dots is not because the dot pattern is ever-changing.  
Thanks to Jan Brascamp for this figure. 
 
Left eye Right eye
Left eye Right eye
Different colors 
Same color
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Figure I 
Figure I (Box 1). Binocular rivalry stimuli. The masculine face is presented to the left eye and the 
feminine face to the right eye. If the subject is attending to local features or parts such as the 
eyes, standard binocular rivalry ensues.  This is indicated by the label "alternating percepts” and 
illustrated as first a masculine face, then a feminine face, then a masculine face.  If the subject is 
attending to holistic features such as gender or the identity of the person, the subject sees a 
persisting morphed androgynous face (“stable morph”), as pictured. Thanks to Chris Klink for this 
figure. See [25]. 
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Figure II 
Figure II (Box 1). Stimulus Showing the Local Nature of Rivalry. These are sample stimuli used in 
a binocular rivalry experiment.  Each image is projected to a different eye.  Thanks to Thomas 
Carlson for this figure. See [26] 
 
 
